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Abstract. Implementation of governance principles entails intra-urban territorializations in sub-
Saharan African cities, which increase the risks of fragmentation and raise the question of local
scale regulation in both its political and spatial dimensions.
Key Words: Urban Management, Governance, Regulation, Territory, Segregation,
Fragmentation, Sub-Saharan African cities
Résumé. La mise en œuvre des principes de gouvernance provoque des territorialisations intra-
urbaines qui accroissent les risques de fragmentation dans les villes africaines et posent la
question de la régulation à l’échelle locale dans ses deux dimensions, politique et spatiale.
Mots-clés : Gestion urbaine, gouvernance, régulation, territoire, ségrégation, fragmentation, villes
d’Afrique subsaharienne
The local urban governments in sub-Saharan Africa born out of the decentralization reforms
implemented since the 1980s are facing a major challenge. Both products and vectors of social
change (Dubresson, Raison, 1998), cities are particularly affected by the crisis in politico-
economic structures resulting from increasing poverty that “bottom-up” urban dynamics have not
managed to curb. Yet, despite a reduction in the demographic growth rate, the African urban
population (209 million city-dwellers in 2000) could reach 592 million in 2030.
It is therefore crucial to stimulate localized development policies that are likely in the short term
to increase urban value added, reduce poverty, ensure financing of equipment and infrastructures,
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and modernize central areas while helping disadvantaged zones catch up. New systems able to
take into account the demands of the middle and upper classes as well as the poorest urban
populations must also be implemented. Difficult choices often need to be made to reconcile such
contradictory objectives at the same time as the liberalization of economies comes with
accelerated competition in cities in a changing, poorly stabilized institutional framework with
frequently limited financial resources. These choices rely on recomposing local public action that
combines the principles of “good governance” and “good government”. Today, considerable
work has been done in the fields of political science, sociology, and economics on the genesis,
content and theoretical stakes of the concepts of governance and regulation but little of this work
takes into account the spatial dimensions of the processes set in motion.
The redistribution of responsibilities also tends to reshape the urban territories for local policies
by multiplying perimeters of collective action in function of diverse interests and coalitions. Is
this new intra-urban territorialization an adequate response to the growing socio-economic
differentiation of city dwellers? Does it make cities marked by segregation and social polarization
more governable or does it accentuate fragmented management? Does it favor integration or
nurture urban fragmentation?
I. Governance and Intra-Urban Territorial Demarcation
1. From Management to Governance: Mixed Reforming Complexes
At the beginning of the 1980s, decentralization and urban management—defined as the set of
mechanisms coordinating technical services and regulation contributing to urban operations, a set
of acts aiming to reconcile antagonistic demands and interests that can not be equally satisfied—
made up the foundations of new politico-institutional engineering that aimed, through structural
adjustment plans, to reform post-colonial States whose nature and operations were considered to
hamper development and democracy-building. In addition to providing greater managerial
efficiency, these reforms were expected to favor the process of organizing cities as collective
political and economic stakeholders and engines for local development and territorialized social
policies. Analyzed in relation to the increased efficiency of sectoral public policies and urban
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management, decentralizing reforms have until now been disappointing while whole segments of
societies escaped all instituted political control and State powers functioned on several registers.
At the end of the 1980s, the notion of governance, understood as the set of processes coordinating
stakeholders, social groups, and institutions and aiming to implement collectively negotiated
urban projects (Jaglin, 1998-a; McCarney, 1996), imposed itself. Operational recourse to
governance, an ancient concept in Anglo-Saxon thought, is not so much an observation of this
lack as it is the explicit acknowledgement of systems of stakeholders, resources and processes
that, outside the State sphere, de facto regulate—and have long regulated—urbanization
mechanisms in a large number of African cities where 40 to 70% of the urban population live in
illegal settlements and depend on informal jobs.
For donors, and especially the World Bank, one must favor the deployment of diverse
stakeholders by reducing the State’s field of direct action as much as possible via diverse
privatization and “communitization”1 schemes and re-focus the State on two strategic functions:
regulation and facilitation. Leaving the selection of new partners to market mechanisms, the
World Bank is focusing on stabilizing States and improving their functions (World Bank, 1997),
emphasizing the (minimalist) conditions to consolidate “good government”.
Real social choices are thus evacuated under cover of “technical” macro-political and macro-
economic stabilization measures. The debate on coordination conditions for unsupervised
initiatives in institutional urban management schemes is, however, still open. For some, control
of this element must remain a matter for the public sphere: governance would then be the result
of the way in which government authorities maintain the viability of other social stakeholders,
and pilot, manage and negotiate coordination between the latter and their own interests (Swilling,
1997). For others, governance must be more “civilian” and break with the decision-making
hegemony of public structures by obliging them to share power (McCarney, 1996). State powers
and local urban governments in Africa have steered a delicate course between these two
approaches in such a way that the decentralization-privatization-participation triptych and
governance principles have been locally re-appropriated and combined according to very diverse
formulas resulting in a variety of reform systems. Between the powerful metropolitan
governments of South Africa and local branches of central powers in Ethiopia or Togo, local
urban governments are characterized by a large range of institutional hybrids.
                                                
1 Transfer of public sector functions or responsibilities to non-governmental or associative stakeholders.
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Nevertheless, the logic behind governance choices favors the more or less coordinated
distribution of regulations among diverse public and private (national and international)
organizations, NGOs, and various associations. These “arrangements” have multiple
consequences. First, they reduce the role of public authorities and urban government stricto
sensu, often removing the implemented regulations from the electoral control of citizens whose
votes sanction a stakeholder that is not always in control. Next, they confine—even community
empowerment versions—the direct participation of these same citizens to an operational tool for
the exclusive use of disadvantaged city dwellers, which leaves room for doubt as to affirmations
linking governance and “community” mobilization. Finally, they contribute to the emergence or
accentuation of intra-urban demarcation.
2. Spaces for New Arrangements: Territorialization of Urbanized Areas
Faced with the complexity of tasks, the diversity of objectives and differentiation of clienteles,
local urban governments in Africa specialize and spatialize their interventions, which facilitates
the search for ad hoc cooperative efforts for the benefit of target populations. The trend is to
increasingly externalize functions to very diverse partners and via varied arrangements and
schemes, notably among urban utilities. Thus, in English-speaking Africa, local municipal
governments that are in charge of utilities privilege “privatization” in the form of
commercialization or delegation. In the poor neighborhoods of these cities and in cities run by
powers that, either de jure or de facto, have less extensive jurisdiction, “communitarization” (or
taking charge of a set of tasks by grassroots communities, NGOs, or even religious missions,
sometimes acting for projects associating foreign cities or bilateral aid organizations) is
dominant. By thus demarcating urban spaces, these new arrangements contribute to the
emergence of intra-urban territories. According to Sack’s analysis (1986, p. 19), we use the
concept of “territory” to define an area whose bordering process and control aim to exercise
power over a population.
a. The Territories of Solvent Clienteles
Privatization aims to rationalize how utilities are managed and offer improved utilities at
advantageous prices for users while reducing local budgets. The question is rarely raised from the
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outset in spatial terms. Yet, privatization in East Africa has shown that the main stumbling block
for experiments in particular is the issue of generalizing utilities to whole urbanized areas
(UNCHS, 1998). The management contracts signed for waste collection bear witness to this.
Contract management has turned out to be difficult for local governments who barely live up to
their financial obligations; the greatest dissatisfaction, however, comes from the splintering of
utilities in function of the spatial distribution of solvent clienteles. Indeed, privatization concerns
above all middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, whereas poor and lower-middle income
neighborhoods did not receive offers in response to their calls for bids. None of the private
companies to which management has been delegated have yet extended utilities to neighborhoods
that are not already covered. The gains in utility efficiency were thus made to the benefit of part
of the solvent population and the neighborhoods were they live, and to the detriment of the
universal nature of the utilities. Of course, universality was not guaranteed under the previous
municipal management system but is now given legal and official expression.  The question thus
remains open as to providing utilities to poor neighborhoods and, above all, integration and social
equity.
b. Secession of the Wealthy: the Gilded Ghettos of the “upper class”
Privatization is also used as a tool for retrenchment by the well-to-do: in many large cities,
private appropriation of roads and public spaces as well as the recourse to personalized security
services sets off an admittedly often still modest secession movement. In South African
metropolitan areas, it has sometimes been accompanied by the autonomization of utility
provision zones for well-to-do clienteles (Heymans, 1991), in a context where the accumulation
of late payments in poor neighborhoods reveals a crisis in public collections and the wealthy
segment is reluctant to pay for those “lacking civic spirit”. The wide-spread
compartmentalization of landscapes, walled housing estates, and carefully protected townhouses
sometimes combine with rate and tax disparities to threaten urban solidarity projects (Bénit,
2001; Chipkin, 1999). Do these secessions truly isolate the richest? The current state of
knowledge is insufficient to grasp the relationships the inhabitants of these “gilded ghettos” have
with their surroundings and the specific nature of their retrenchment. One can, however, admit—
with Yves Grafmeyer (1994)—that isolation and integration are not necessarily antinomic for
well-off city dwellers.
“Rencontres de l’innovation territoriale”
6
c. The Territorial Encapsulation of the Poor
In the urban areas were “the poor” (a very heterogeneous category) live, interventions also
involve increasing territorialization; this is based in part on project approaches that value the
neighborhood scale for its supposed virtues of social homogeneity, citizen foothold, and local
democracy.
This territorialization is characteristically expressed in the field of utilities, whose operators are
confronted daily with commercial and technical difficulties (Lyonnaise des Eaux, 1998). Today,
they seek to substitute systems that encapsulate utility provision to the poor for the passive
deregulation and informalization that had dominated for the past two decades. These new systems
tend to become autonomous according to three principles: territorial and institutional
specification of utility provision sectors, technical diversification among schemes, and user
mobilization/participation (whether organized or not). This strategy can be applied via the
autonomization of specialized organizations in charge of utility provision for the poor, justified
by the mobilization of technical systems that are appropriate to diversify the solvent demand by
the poor or even, when growing differentiation in utilities becomes long-lasting, by externalizing
utility segments via formal or informal delegation isolating types of serviced areas and clienteles
with low profitability (Jaglin, 1998-b). Associating a modern integrated utilities with a range of
spatialized micro-utilities for disadvantaged populations is thus more and more frequent.
By fragmenting technico-management systems, this poor territory encapsulation practice tends to
disqualify transfer mechanisms and, above all, compartmentalize regulation schemes enclosed in
local territories where they are left to local, small-scale authorities. The skillfulness of their
leaders, mediators, and financial brokers can temporarily mask the deficit when it comes to
official regulation, but it rarely suffices to establish a reliable and stable guarantee and appeal
system, even on neighborhood level; in addition, due to a lack of arbitration on a satisfactory
scale (agglomeration, province), it hightens inter-community competition for access to modest
resources.
One of the major challenges is thus measuring the consequences for social cohesion of increasing
assimilation between supposedly homogenous clientele segments, utility supply areas, and
management territories, which trap economic logic—notably cost recovery—within the narrow
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enclosure of poor pseudo-communities and precipitate illegal poor neighborhoods into internal
management.
II. Stakeholder Systems, Coordination, Dislocation: the Regulation Issue
Decentralization reforms were above all attempted to liberate cities from the authority of States
reputed to be corrupt and bureaucratic. In so doing, they did not for all that consolidate the local
urban authorities who often lacked means and skills. To unique authority of the State was added a
set of relationships to the private sector, the tertiary national and international non-commercial
sector, and international aid networks, within which local governments occupy very diverse
positions. By establishing a certain autonomy for local governments, decentralization also gave
rise to new forms of subordination and diversified regulatory modes.
In the narrowest sense of the word, as used by Anglo-Saxons and international organizations,
regulation sets the legal framework for action and covers supervision rules and procedures set out
by government authorities. In France, this term refers rather to the work of regulationist
economists working on the long-term adaptation processes of capitalist macro-systems (Boyer,
Saillard, 1995). Here, the term is used to designate the (legal, economic, and political)
mechanisms used by local urban governments to stabilize antagonisms and ensure the
reproduction of a social system. Except for rare cases (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Togo, for example),
hegemonic State regulation is lessening and daily management of compromises is often
dominated by local regulation based on clientelism and patrimonialism (Jaglin, Dubresson,
1993). What is new is the appearance of a third form of regulation—delegation or discharge
(Hibou, 1999)—whose modalities remain variable both in regards to implementation processes
and the type of partners solicited. What are the end results on urban segregation of these
additions?
1. Stakeholder Systems and Intra-Urban Scales: towards Fragmentation?
a. Segregation and Fragmentation: Two Keys for Interpretation
The social division of African cities, inherited from colonial policies, results from organized
action creating a divided city model and, above all, from apartheid cities. Consecutive spatial
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layouts were far from identical everywhere but, beyond the diversity of shapes which is
accentuated by the diversity of land tenure systems and the illegality of housing production
sectors, cities—especially the largest—were homogenized as tools of colonial administered
economies. They were shaped by two dominant logics—exploitation and segregation—long
convergent, sometimes inflected, but always meaningful after independence that did not mark
rupture. Yet, the crisis in rentier economies and State regulations, the move from Fordism to
flexible accumulation, structural adjustment and the State reforms imposed since 1980, growing
poverty, and informalization challenge the unity of what previously made up the system in and by
segregation.
To understand the process underway, many authors call on the notions of rupture and
fragmentation (Vidal, 1997). Multidimensional, the latter combines spatial (physical
disassociations, morphological discontinuities), social (residential segregation, community
isolation), economic, and above all political components (increasing stakeholder dispersal and
autonomization of urban management and regulation schemes: Jaglin, 2001). It is said to be
characterized by the dilution of organic ties between parts of the city, the impoverishment of the
previous spatial continuum, and repetition of social inequalities at different intra-urban scales,
isolated patches of poverty alongside isolates of wealth within an urban kaleidoscope. In recent
literature, the dominant idea is that fragmentation reduces the governability of cities and develops
new forms of exercise of power. Inversely, do the new management arrangements maintain and
reinforce the fragmentation process, notably by privileging forms of co-responsibility that are
limited to the timeframes and territories of varied projects?
b. Political Fragmentation, Selective Coordination, and Micro-Regulations: Divisive Factors
Management pluralism relies on a growing flexibility in territories of authority, assemblies of
stakeholders, and composite resources.
Some relatively closed and selective systems of stakeholders associate representatives of the
State administrative apparatus, national and foreign private enterprises, and international donors.
Sometimes, local planners whose corporatist interests push them towards this type of alliance are
at work in regionally or even internationally competing metropolitan areas (Cape Town,
Johannesburg). Carried by influential policy communities with diversified resources, projects
privilege the modernization of city centers, urban productivity tools (infrastructure improvement,
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management rationalization of urban utilities of international quality, restoration of major
equipment such as the large markets in West Africa), vast planning operations (office buildings,
commercial malls, hotel complexes, etc.), and peripheral areas where new centralized suburban
clusters and high-technology parks appear. It is striking to note how relative State withdrawal is
in city centers where real estate stakes and the symbolic dimensions of modernization are
rigorously controlled, notably in capital cities.
Often more open systems of stakeholders—associating municipal services, local and national
private sector representatives, and outside stakeholders (notably local governments from the
North and NGOs) to various degrees—operate in legal residential neighborhoods and the
privileged intervention sectors of local governments (land and real estate management, urban
utilities, local public equipment). These partnerships are active, excluding housing, in building
equipment for local uses (neighborhood markets, schools, care centers, standpipe networks), and
sometimes in organizing utilities or segments of municipal services. Accordingly, these schemes
reinforce a renewed alliance between local powers and the urban middle classes weakened by the
crisis by contributing to improve their environment.
In poor neighborhoods and neglected—either abandoned or overwhelmed—intervention areas the
systems of involved stakeholders are very open, sometimes steered by outside agents in the
framework of projects, sometimes reduced to the accumulation of local private initiatives. Here,
decision-making is highly dispersed, participation is much less selectively filtered, and available
resources are unstable: the resulting inequality and compartmentalization of urban micro-
territories are also clearly visible.
Geographic analysis of intervention territories and sectoral analysis of the activities thus
conducted, which remain very much to be done, would probably show that the dominant forms of
local governance increase discontinuity at all scales. One can hypothesize that the more
heterogeneous cities are, the less the current systems strengthen unification of territories and
urban societies; politico-management division amplifies fragmentation by delivering very
unequally endowed urban spaces to a bidding game that increases initial disparities. This
fragmentation is in addition to old forms of segregation that, far from attenuating, are
reconstructed, under the intense socio-economic differentiation at work, above all in
neighborhoods whose salaried populations are victims of crises and successive adjustments.
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Segregation and fragmentation nurture each other due to a lack of massive measures to help
disadvantaged populations catch up and voluntarist schemes to correct intra-urban inequalities.
c. Local Room for Initiative and Learning: Counter-Fragmentation?
Situations are nevertheless far from rigid and opposite trends exist. Some are the effects of (still
fragile) re-legitimization of government authorities in conducting city affairs, encouraged by the
World Bank. The affirmation of these incentive and regulation functions expresses itself in
planning documents (Abidjan, Windhoek), “city projects” (Dakar municipalities), sectoral
takeover (land intervention by Côte d’Ivoire prefects: Kadet Gahié, 1999), standardization of
management of equipment left to informal systems (attempt to regularize standpipe management
in West Africa and Zambia).
Others are born from the institutional play introduced by reforms, margins for initiative that can
be explored by decentralized and local governments involved in local learning processes. Some
produce linkages, pragmatic arrangements, or even counter-fragmentation. They may meet with a
strong response from local and national executives (this was the case in Ouagadougou when joint
management made it possible for the outlying areas to catch up), or remain in the shadows (such
as the forms of financial cross-subsidization for land development and utility management
between well-off neighborhoods and poor neighborhoods in Windhoek: Peyroux, 2000).
Other unifiying liaisons are carried by new public/private mediation stakeholders. Rushing into
the breach of failing public regulation, private structures that belong to the tertiary non-
commercial sector developed structuring activities and functions for local urban society
(inhabitants’, producers’, and storekeepers’ associations, unions, NGOs, etc.). While they do not
always have the ambition to work on reintegrating cities from the outset, they often have the
effect of emphasizing social cohesion and, today, are promoted by numerous projects, including
technical projects, as indispensable intermediaries (pS-Eau, 1998). Actions of international scope,
such as the decentralized development aid program financed by the EC Commission Delegation,
bet explicitly on these stakeholders to anchor decentralization in a new institutional culture based
on participation, dialogue, and coordination between the various levels of social and political
organization (of Boismenu et al., 1999; Allou, Di Loreto, 2000).
Other processes are at work and pertain to sociability and its networks (in Abidjan: Marie, 1998),
reinvestment resulting from international migrations (in Dakar: Tall, 2000), and residential
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mobility (in Bamako: Bertrand, 2000). It remains to be determined whether or not these re-
affiliation mechanisms, notably for disadvantaged populations, are precursors of innovative and
sustainable mechanisms.
2. Urban Territories and Regulation
a. Public Regulations: from Hegemony to Selection
Any study of fragmentation may not therefore be disassociated from the study of authorities and
their urban management.  Analyses of governance in Southern Africa highlight the formation of
flexible and sophisticated forms of partnership, negotiation, and contractualisation destined to
ensure management coordination of this plurality of stakeholders (Swilling, 1997).  They do not
sufficiently discuss the fact that these widened partnerships—that are often deprived of stabilized
frameworks for action and overall regulation schemes—can above all favor oligarchic
agreements between dominant stakeholders aiming to promote similar interests selectively and
temporarily, to the detriment of other priorities that are nevertheless proclaimed by official urban
policies.
In African cities, the gap between announced objectives (integration, catching up) and concrete
results remains enormous. States claim close control of urban affairs even though they have
rarely exercised such control in the past. The current situation corresponds more to selective
interlocking of niches, without concern for overall coherency. Local governments proceed in the
same manner, choosing certain niches and leaving others to national and foreign NGOs and
collective associations. The results appear to conform with the expectations of numerous
opinions on decentralization but, while claiming to come from the principle of subsidiarity, this
approach proceeds in the opposite manner: the upper levels of the State administrative apparatus
define, by elimination, what belongs to them before each of the lower levels does the same.
b. Local Scale Regulation: Territory as Tool?
These observations lead to the crucial question of local scale regulation. Regulationist economists
working at macro scale identify “territories” that in fact designate institutional configurations. At
local scale, applications of regulation theory are somewhat more spatialized but mainly concern
groups of enterprises (industrial districts, clusters). The regulation concept is rarely
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territorialized, except in a few pioneer analyses of United States municipalities (Harvey, Scott,
1989), the location of investments in urbanized areas (Storper, 2000), or labor relations (Dupuy,
Gilly, Perrat, 2001). Yet, urban governance—which is only part of the institutional reconstruction
effecting the ensemble of socio-political balances—refers to two dimensions of local regulation.
The first, of a political nature, concerns arbitration between economic competitiveness and social
equity. Today, the objectives of management rationalization and economic productivity win out
over social redistribution. How are poor city dwellers demands covered? And by whom? If
previous practices (equity subsidization of rates for utilities, cross-subsidies for access to land,
etc.) are disqualified, how and by whom are the functions that were supposed to fulfilled by
public utility monopolies ensured? Under what conditions can local promotion stimulate the
policy coordination modes indispensable to income redistribution? What social and economic
sustainability can these new arrangements have?
The second, of a geographic nature, deals with spatial dimensions and control of processes
underway. The plurality of schemes and practitioners of diverse statuses favors the
territorialization of different management systems and the multiplication of local intra-urban
regulation systems that threaten urban cohesion and unified city operation. Whose responsibility
is it to coordinate the location of private investments within urban areas? Who must ensure the
coherency of the utility supply and, for example, arbitrate between its extension to poor clienteles
and the maintenance of existing networks? Who should block the temptation of certain segments
of wealthy city dwellers to disassociate themselves?
To answer these questions, we think it is pertinent to promote territorialized regulation as an
object of geographic investigation. This implies articulating different scales: the relationships
between multinational utility companies and contracting local governments, those between the
major national objectives and those set by local urban governments can not be disassociated from
the modes of regulation detected at local scale in urban areas. What is more, at this scale, it
becomes possible to move beyond the academic distinction between the study of spheres of
power and that of urbanized areas by privileging the identification of reciprocity between systems
of stakeholders and intra-urban differentiation; it raises a vital issue—inventing new modes of
public action that outdo former principles of planning and project urbanism without totally
disqualifying them. This quest for territorialized regulation instruments is complicated—as the
emblematic Cape Town experience shows (Watson, 2000)—but, if one believes that such
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instruments are needed for democratically elected local governments to implement social
policies, a vast field of theoretical and operational research is open to geographers.
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